Research

Dissertation:

Putting the 'Take' in Takeover: Causes and Consequences of Confiscation as a Revolutionary Practice

Committee: Eric Lob (Chair), Todd Makse, Eduardo Gamarra, Zachary Levenson (Sociology).

Why do some revolutions result in confiscation and others do not? And what are the consequences of revolutionary confiscation for the political economy of post-revolutionary states? While the scholarship identifies various post-revolutionary policies, practices, and transformations after the revolutions, especially in terms of democratization, democratic backsliding, and economic development, the causes and outcomes of revolutionary confiscation and its theoretical and practical implications have been overlooked in the scholarship. This dissertation examines the causes and outcomes of revolutionary confiscation in post-revolutionary states. I argue that the causes behind the practice of revolutionary confiscation in some post-revolutionary states can be explained by the extent to which pre-revolutionary conditions intensified ideology as the driver of the revolution, especially in contexts with patrimonial, neo-patrimonial, and colonial legacies. In addition, revolutionary confiscation has significant political-economic and societal consequences in post-revolutionary states. It increases the capability of post-revolutionary states to encounter change by building and reinforcing electoral authoritarianism. Revolutionary confiscation also increases corruption by shaping patron-client networks based on the capacity gained from nationalizing natural resources and decreasing economic freedom using socialist economic policies. Ultimately, revolutionary confiscation promotes state dominance over society by deteriorating civil liberties and weakening civil society.

Works in Progress:

A Neo-Prebendal Polity: Iran's Political Economy Under the Islamic Republic

In this project, I examine Iran’s political economy under the Islamic Republic. I propose a theory of neo-prebendalist politics as a new way to understand the poor performance of development policies in Iran. Neo-prebendalism is a more complex, advanced, and widespread form of prebendalism, based on the appropriation of public resources for the private interests of political-economic elites. It is exerted systematically, institutionally, and legally through bankocracy, an uncompetitive market society, and undeserved legalized rights. I argue that in this rent-seeking polity, parastatal goods are prioritized over public ones, and collective modes of rent-seeking are embedded within the state's political economy. The concept of the middle class does not fully explain Iranian society; instead, I suggest using “neo-prebendal class” as an alternative concept. In this neo-prebendal structure, features such as neo-prebendal morality and the celebritization of politics and society contribute to and sustain the rentier ideology of the state. This mechanism hinders the formation of a developmental state, paralyzes developmental policies, and perpetuates the suspension of development in Iran.

“Corruption and Democracy Under the Islamic Republic,” (with Eric Lob)

This project examines the impact of corruption on electoral trust, voter turnout, institutional trust, satisfaction with the political system, and democracy in Iran, thereby contributing to our quantitative understanding of the relationship between corruption and democratization in the country.